

St. Thomas Aquinas on Human and Divine Forgiveness

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Two major influences guide St. Thomas Aquinas in his discussions of forgiveness—Greek and Roman philosophical thought and Christian Revelation. Although there is certainly some notion of forgiveness, human and divine, in pagan thought, it turns out to be quite different from Christian forgiveness. The foundations for this difference lie in how pagans and Christians understand what it is to be human and the meaning of divinity. In this paper, we shall not try to trace out the intricate relations between pagan and Christian thought on matters human and divine. Rather, we shall limit ourselves to a consideration of the notion of forgiveness as it may be found in Aristotle and in St. Thomas. In both cases, the model of human forgiveness is closely associated with that of divine forgiveness.

In Greek religion, the gods are mostly in our image: although they are immortal and certainly more powerful, they are not really much better than we are. Because of their power, it is important for us to propitiate them, to get them to help us or to turn away their wrath. The problem is that this power of the gods is not strongly tied to a sense of moral responsibility either among the gods themselves or towards us. The gods seem to be rather indifferent about us. Either they see us as their playthings, good for entertainment, or they have more important things to do than to care about us. What is more, the pagan view that fate rules inexorably over gods and men alike calls into question both the need for and the possibility of human or divine forgiveness. Plato and Aristotle work against this trend toward fated meaninglessness, seeking to purify the ideas of goodness and divinity. In many ways they are successful, but at the cost of creating a vast gulf between the human and the divine. For Plato, human life in this world is like being in a prison: it is only by escaping from the human and the historical that we may hope to reach the divine and find our happiness. Aristotle's notion of divinity—pure actuality, self-thinking thought—does not seem to be in any real relation to us, such that communication of forgiveness from God to us would be at all possible. In this paper, we shall not try to trace out the intricate relations between pagan and Christian thought on matters human and divine. Rather, we shall limit ourselves to a consideration of the notion of forgiveness as it may be found in Aristotle and in St. Thomas. In both cases, the model of human forgiveness is closely associated with that of divine forgiveness.

In his metaphysics, Aristotle characterizes God as the most perfect being, in fact, as pure actuality.¹ Since the highest activity that we know is thinking, God must be thinking or something more perfect than thinking—whatever that could be. And if God is perfect, then He must be thinking about the most perfect thing, and that is himself. It would make no sense for God to think about us, for we are unworthy of such divine contemplation. Aristotle's God is neither the free creator of all things nor provident over them. Hence, the idea of divine

¹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 12.6.1171b20. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, 8.16.1163b15–19, Aristotle does offer a more traditional view of the gods as the sources of the goods we have, to whom we owe piety, as we do to our parents who give us the good of life.

forgiveness would make no sense, for there is no way we could offend God. True enough, God would not be vindictive toward us, for that would be imperfect. But there is no reason to believe that God is anything but indifferent to us, or that indeed God is even aware of us. Why, indeed, should he who is perfect be concerned with imperfection? In fact, if he were, it would be a sign of his imperfection.

Forgiveness, insofar as it appears in Aristotle's ethical writings, seems to be found chiefly in the character of the magnanimous or high-minded person.² Since the magnanimous person is the perfection of human virtue, that person's virtue of forgiveness is thought to be a good thing. The magnanimous person does indeed pardon those who have harmed or offended him or her, and this is good. But the goodness is associated with the magnanimous person's own virtue, not with real concern for the one who is pardoned. The magnanimous person forgives because it would be petty not to: such a person is above any desire for vengeance, rather the way God is above being concerned with this world. "A high-minded man is thought to be one who, being worthy of great things, requires of himself that he be worthy of them."³ Such a person prefers to give goods rather than to receive them. But to forgive a debt is to give something good. Thus, the magnanimous person will be likely to do this. "For he who received a good is inferior to the man who conferred it, and a high-minded man wishes to be superior."⁴ Such a person will not ask for help, but will be ready to help others. "It is the mark of the high-minded man, too, never, or hardly ever, to ask for help but to be of help to others readily."⁵ Such a person, if treated unjustly, does not harbor vindictiveness. "Nor will he bear grudges; for it is the mark of a high-minded man not to bring up the past, especially what was bad, but rather to overlook this."⁶ However, the reason for not bearing grudges is a sense of superiority and the desire to preserve personal virtue. There is no sense that pardoning an offense is meant to contribute to the virtue or ultimate happiness of the one forgiven. Thus, the forgiveness of the magnanimous person is in the image of divine forgiveness—more a forgetfulness or an indifference than an active engagement with the one forgiven for his or her good.

An indication that the forgiveness associated with the high-minded person differs substantially from the Christian notion is that high-mindedness is a virtue related to honor. "A high-minded man is concerned with honors and dishonors as he should be."⁷ Honor is indeed related to other people, but not insofar as it is concerned with them but insofar as it is bestowed

² Discussed in Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (hereafter *NE*) 4.7–8.1123a35–1125a17, tr. Hippocrates Apostle (Grinnell, Iowa: Peripatetic Press, 1984). Three other places where Aristotle mentions something like forgiveness are notable. One is when he speaks of pardoning the involuntary, as in Book 3, Ch. 1, and later in his discussions of continence in Book 7, Ch. 3. But this is not forgiveness of what ought to be punished, but a recognition that there is really no moral act, since a moral act must be voluntary. Another is where he speaks of the equitable man forgiving what in justice is owed. Here Aristotle considers forgiveness a species of right judgment (Book 6, Ch. 11). The third is where he mentions the possibility of the creditor remitting a debt, as a father might do for his son, or possibly (although not mentioned by Aristotle) God might do for us (Book 8, Ch. 16).

³ *NE* 4.7.1123b2–3, p. 65.

⁴ *NE* 4.8.1124b14–15, p. 68.

⁵ *NE* 4.8.1124b18–19, p. 68.

⁶ *NE* 4.8.1125a4–6, p. 68.

⁷ *NE* 4.7.1123b21, p. 65.

by them. Thus, the indifference that the high-minded person shows to slights and injustices is motivated by the desire to be honored, not so much by the person pardoned, but by the rest of society, or at least by those who matter.

Some notion of forgiveness is also found in the good-tempered person, who is not liable to rush to vengeance in anger. This virtue falls between the vices of irascibility and inirascibility; that is, it is being angry when and to the degree that one should. But the virtue tends, if anything, toward inirascibility. “A good-tempered man tends to be unperturbed and not to be led by his feeling but to be angered in the manner and on the occasions and for the length of time [etc.] as dictated by reason. He seems to err rather in the direction of deficiency, for a good-tempered man is not disposed to take vengeance but rather to pardon.”⁸ Again, it is the excess of anger that is the greater vice, and the tendency to forgive which is commended. “To good temper we oppose the excess more than the deficiency, for it is more common since vengeance is more characteristic of men than forgiveness.”⁹ But again, the forgiveness at issue is a result of the virtuous person’s self-control: not easily becoming angry, the person does not insist on vengeance. The non-insistence on vengeance is what is meant by forgiveness here. The virtue of good-temperedness is a kind of temperance in the person who forgives, not a reaching out to the person who is forgiven.

There is, of course, real virtue in the high-minded and good-tempered person, and St. Thomas shows his appreciation of it in his *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* and elsewhere. On the high-minded or magnanimous person who prefers bestowing favors to receiving them, Thomas comments: “Accordingly it seems characteristic of the magnanimous person to remember those for whom he does favors but not those who do favors to him, since this is contrary to his desire of wanting to excel in goodness.”¹⁰ To excel in goodness is really to be virtue. It is not merely a matter of forgetting or indifference. The magnanimous person refuses to think about what he or she is owed because doing so is nobler than not doing so. Or at least this is the way Thomas interprets it. When Aristotle claims that the high-minded man will not bear grudges, Thomas comments that it is by deliberate choice that the magnanimous person forgets the injuries, which choice is at least something of what we mean by forgiveness. At least, as deliberate, the act is more than mere forgetting. “The magnanimous person deliberately determines to forget injuries he has suffered inasmuch as he despises the things by which he could not be disparaged.”¹¹ Such a person does choose to forgive (forget); however, this is because the person despises the evils received, not out of concern to the well-being of the one pardoned. This is indeed noble, but it has no real reference to the person who is forgiven. Later on Aristotle even talks about a kind of forgiveness of enemies by the high-minded person. “He

⁸ *NE* 4.11.1125b34–1126a3, p. 71.

⁹ *NE* 4.11.1126a30–32, p. 72.

¹⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* (hereafter *CNE*), IV. L.X: C 764, tr. C. I. Litzinger, O.P. (Chicago: Regnery, 1964), vol. 1, p. 335; Et inde est, quod magnanimi videntur in memoria habere eos quibus dant beneficia, non autem eos a quibus recipiunt. Hoc enim est contrarium voluntati eius secundum quam vult superexcellere in bono. (Unless otherwise noted, latin texts are from www.corpusthomicum.org.)

¹¹ *Ibid*, C 778; 1:337; Alia ratio est, quia ad magnanimum specialiter pertinet oblivisci malorum quae passus est, in quantum scilicet ea despicit, utpote a quibus minorari non potuit.

will speak no evil, not even of his enemies, except when insulted.”¹² Speaking evil is in itself bad, since it is not good to think about evil things, and therefore the magnanimous person will not normally do it. However, because the person is mindful of justice, to speak evil of enemies if they treat one unjustly is legitimate. Aristotle is certainly not saying that one should love one’s enemies, that one should reach out to those who have harmed one, which is essential to the Christian notion of forgiveness.

St. Thomas also appreciates Aristotle’s insight into the virtue of good-temperedness or meekness and its relationship to pardoning others. As Aristotle says, the “good-tempered man is not disposed to take vengeance but rather to pardon.”¹³ The virtue is to be “angry” in the right way, at the right time. We should not leap to vengeance. As Thomas comments, “When we call a person meek, we signify that he is not inclined to punish but to forgive and remit punishments.”¹⁴ We do think that such a mean of anger is good, but we can ask why the person pardons. Is it just the virtue of moderation, exercised by the choice to repress the anger? Or is it love for the person who has harmed one? This last seems not to be part of Aristotle’s answer, for being good-tempered or meek is a moral virtue having to do with a mean in us. Although it is occasioned by a relation with another who is perceived as unjust, it is not essentially linked with such a relation to the other. But this relationship to the other in love is essential for the Christian notion of forgiveness.

St. Thomas discusses this matter more fully in a passage from the *Summa theologiae* in which he distinguishes two elements in Aristotle’s good-temperedness—the forgoing of anger (meekness, *mansuetudine*) and the remission of punishment (clemency, *clementia*).¹⁵ In general, these virtues fall under the virtue of temperance, which concerns the regulation according to right reason of the passions of anger and vindictiveness.¹⁶ As Aristotle said, the good-tempered person will not give in to these too much, but just the right amount to fit the occasion. Later in the question, St. Thomas asks whether meekness and clemency are the greatest of virtues.¹⁷ He denies that they are because it is better to be good than to cease from being evil. Meekness and clemency, as restraints on passions, are negative virtues: they are *not* giving in to anger and vindictiveness. This refusal to do evil is commendable, but it is not as good as actively doing what is good. Thus, he says that the theological virtues and the cardinal virtues of justice and prudence are better. “Now it is more perfect to obtain good than to lack evil. Wherefore those

¹² *NE* 4.8.1125a9, p. p. 69.

¹³ *NE* 4.11.1126a2, p. 71.

¹⁴ *CNE* IV, L.XIII, C 802. 1:350; Cum enim dicitur aliquis mansuetus, significatur quod non sit punitivus, sed magis remittat et condonet poenas.

¹⁵ “They differ from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment, while meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger” (*ST* 2–2.157.1, p. 1829); Differunt tamen ab invicem, in quantum clementia est moderativa exterioris punitionis, mansuetudo autem proprie diminuit passionem irae.

¹⁶ *ST* 2–2.157. 3.

¹⁷ *ST* 2–2.157.4.

virtues like faith, hope, charity, and likewise prudence and justice, which direct one to good simply, are absolutely greater virtues than clemency and meekness.”¹⁸

The greatest of all virtues is charity, which moves us to care for our neighbor, even our enemy, for that neighbor’s own sake.¹⁹ Of the two virtues discussed in this question, clemency is closer to charity than meekness because it moves us to do good for our neighbor. “As to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity, the greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good towards our neighbor, and hinder his evil.”²⁰ The purpose here is not just to maintain one’s own virtue (temperance of anger and of the desire to punish), but to do good for one’s neighbor and, even more deeply, help the neighbor not to do evil. Because moral good (doing good) is greater than external goods (receiving good), we show love more perfectly for our neighbor by helping him or her to be morally good than by providing comfort and the relief from obligation that forgiveness provides. This is, of course, difficult to do well, for we cannot directly move our neighbor’s will without violating his or her freedom, and we must avoid the attempt to force our neighbor to choose in a certain way. But this is the very essence of forgiveness, properly understood, that it moves the will of the one forgiven to good and away from evil without coercion and with no strings attached.

Key to God’s mercy in Christ is the forgiveness of our sins. The first sin is preferring our will to the will of God. All sin is, at root, against God. Since this is true, only God can forgive sin. Already, we see a dramatic difference from the pagan view. God really can and does forgive sins. The world is created by God, and God’s creative power, which is also his power to forgive, transcends our power to sin. “Contraries exclude each other; therefore, as the aids of grace are taken from man by sin, so sins are forgiven by the gifts of grace. Otherwise man’s malice in committing sin would be more powerful in banishing divine grace than the divine goodness is in expelling sin by the gifts of grace.”²¹ God in his omnipotence can forgive sins.²² And insofar as sins are against God, only He can forgive them. “God alone can forgive sin. For only one against whom an offense is directed can forgive the offence.”²³

But forgiveness is not just from God; the power to forgive is given to us, and even required of us. God himself has said so. Jesus gives the Apostles the power to forgive sins. “I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatever you bind on earth will be bound

¹⁸ *ST 2–2.157.4*, p. 1831; Perfectius autem est consequi bonum quam carere malo. Et ideo virtutes quae simpliciter ordinant in bonum, sicut fides, spes, caritas, et etiam prudentia et iustitia, sunt simpliciter maiores virtutes quam clementia et mansuetudo.

¹⁹ *ST 2–2.23.6*.

²⁰ *ST 2–2.157.4*, p. 1831; Clementia vero, in hoc quod diminuit poenas, maxime videtur accedere ad caritatem, quae est potissima virtutum, per quam bona operamur ad proximos et eorum mala impedimus.

²¹ *Compendium theologiae* (hereafter *CT*), 144, tr. Cyril Vollert, S.J., in *Aquinas’s Shorter Summa* (Manchester, NH: Sophia, 2002), p. 163; Contraria autem se invicem expellunt. Unde sicut per peccata huiusmodi auxilia gratuita ab homine tolluntur, ita per gratuita dona peccata homini remittuntur: alioquin malitia hominis in peccando plus posset dum removet gratiam divinam, quam divina bonitas ad removendum peccata per gratiae dona.

²² *ST 1.25.3.ad3*.

²³ *CT 146*, p. 165; Peccata vero remittere solus Deus potest. Culpa enim contra aliquem commissa ille solus remittere potest contra quem committitur.

in heaven and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven.”²⁴ And he tells us always to forgive: “Not seven times, but, I tell you, seventy-seven times.”²⁵ Human forgiveness is central to the Lord’s prayer: in fact our being forgiven by God is said to be conditioned by our forgiving our neighbor. “Forgive us our debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors.”²⁶ How is this possible? And how does it transform the idea of human forgiveness from what it is in Aristotle?

Let us consider the sacramental roots of this forgiveness. In the first place, St. Thomas says that it is the humanity of Christ which works our forgiveness.²⁷ “Christ’s death is the cause of the remission of our sin.”²⁸ But Christ only dies because he is human. Thus, it is his humanity that saves us. We are not saved by transcending humanity, as seems to be the case for Plato and Aristotle, but by our humanity itself, as we share it with Jesus Christ. Not only does Jesus himself bring us forgiveness of sins, but he passes on this authority to forgive sins to the apostles and the priesthood. He leaves us himself in the sacraments of the Church, and in the sacrament of penance he provides for the ongoing forgiveness of our sins. “God alone absolves from sin and forgives sin authoritatively; yet priests do both ministerially, because the words of the priest in this sacrament work as instruments of the Divine power, as in the other sacraments.”²⁹ God gives to others his authority to forgive. St. Thomas notes three moments of every sacrament: sacrament only (*sacramentum tantum*), reality and sacrament (*res autem et sacramentum*), and reality only (*res autem tantum et non sacramentum*).³⁰ The outward acts of penitent and priest is the sacrament only. The inner repentance of the sinner is sacrament and reality. The forgiveness of sin itself is reality alone and not sacrament. As St. Thomas points out, there is a real way in which the first and second are causes of the third, even though the third is wholly the act of God. “The first of these taken altogether is the cause of the second; the first and second altogether are the cause of the third.”³¹ The forgiveness of sins depends on the words of absolution of the priest and the free will of the repentant sinner. Although God alone can forgive sins, he has given that authority to us and honors our freedom in choosing to repent.

Not only does the priest have the power to forgive sins; so do we. So the Lord tells us. Peter asks how often he is to forgive his neighbor, and Jesus tells him as often as is needed.³² But how can we do something if we lack the proper authority? In his commentary on the Apostles’ Creed, Thomas speaks of the gift of authority given to the apostles and to all the Church. “Not only is the efficacy of Christ’s Passion communicated to us, but also the merits of His life; and besides this all the good deeds of holy men are communicated to those who are in state of

²⁴ Matthew 16:19 (All biblical texts are from NRSV). “If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain the sins of any, they are retained” (John 20:23).

²⁵ Matthew 18:22.

²⁶ Matthew 6:12.

²⁷ *CT* 185.

²⁸ *CT* 239, p. 311; Sic igitur mors Christi est causa remissionis peccati nostri.

²⁹ *ST* 3.84.3. ad 3, p.2525.; solus Deus per auctoritatem et a peccato absolvit et peccata remittit. Sacerdotes autem utrumque faciunt per ministerium, in quantum scilicet verba sacerdotis in hoc sacramento instrumentaliter operantur, sicut etiam in aliis sacramentis.

³⁰ *ST* 3.84.1.ad3, p. 2524.

³¹ *Ibid*; Quorum primum totum simul sumptum est causa secundi; primum autem et secundum sunt causa tertii.

³² See Matthew 18:21.

grace.”³³ Since we are the body of Christ, we receive all the graces from that body. Thus, the good of forgiveness which comes from Christ is given to us. And the goodness of others is also given to us. “Hence it is that a man who lives in a state of grace is a partaker of all the good that is done in the whole world.”³⁴

Even more dramatically, in the Lord’s Prayer Jesus tells us to forgive our neighbor as a condition for our being forgiven ourselves. Although it is true that the authority of the priesthood operates by the authority of God, all authority to forgive sins—even of God—only works through our freedom. We cannot repent and be forgiven against our will. More than this, we will only be forgiven if we choose to forgive. God’s forgiveness is contingent on our forgiveness. “For this reason this petition alone is made conditional, by our saying, *As we forgive our debtors*; for if thou forgivest not, thou wilt not be forgiven.”³⁵

Of course, one should say that our own readiness to forgive is preceded by God’s grace. There is an ambiguity in the phrase “forgive us our sins as we forgive those who sin against us.” It can be read conditionally, as Thomas takes it in his commentary, but it can be read causally in the sense that our forgiveness of neighbor is possible because of God’s forgiveness of us. Our ability to repent enough even to pray for forgiveness has its source (as all things do) in the fount of all grace—the sacrificed humanity of Christ. In his *Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer*, St. Thomas says that there are two virtues we must bring to prayer. The first is fear or humility before the awesome presence of our Creator. This is the opposite of presumption: we must freely admit and take responsibility for our sin. Yet the movement to do so is itself a matter of grace. This is made clear by the second virtue St. Thomas says is essential—the infused virtue of hope. In the face of our sins, we would despair if we tried to rely only on ourselves. But we are not left to ourselves. When we pray, we hope, and the hope is strengthened in us by our asking for forgiveness. “It is, therefore, most profitable for us to hope always, since however great a sinner a man may be, he should hope that God will forgive him, if he be thoroughly contrite and converted: and this hope is strengthened in us when we pray: *Forgive us our debts*.”³⁶

Hence, as true as it is that God’s grace is primary, grace does not take away the requirement for us freely to forgive those who have harmed us. Perhaps, Thomas suggests, we shy away from saying that we forgive sins because we do not wish to lie or be presumptuous. We do not pretend to such selfless regard for the other. In response, Thomas alludes to the grace of

³³ Thomas Aquinas, *Exposition of the Apostle’s Creed*, 10, in *The Three Greatest Prayers*, tr. Lawrence Shapcote, O.P. (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1956), 10, p. 83; *Sciendum est etiam, quod non solum virtus passionis Christi communicatur nobis, sed etiam meritum vitae Christi. Et quidquid boni fecerunt omnes sancti, communicatur in caritate existentibus.*

³⁴ *Ibid*; *Et inde est quod qui in caritate vivit, particeps est omnis boni quod fit in toto mundo.*

³⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer*, Fifth Petition, in *The Three Greatest Prayers*, pp. 22–23; *Et ideo solummodo in ista petitione ponitur contritio, cum dicitur: sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris. Si ergo non dimittis, non dimittetur tibi.*

³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 21; *Ergo multum est utile quod semper speremus: quia quantumcumque homo sit peccator, debet sperare quod Deus, si perfecte coneratur et convertatur, dimittet ei. Haec autem spes firmatur in nobis cum petimus: dimitte nobis debita nostra.*

the Church. “I answer that he does not lie, for he prays not in his own person, but in that of the Church, who is not deceived: hence the petition is expressed in the plural.”³⁷

St. Thomas speaks, here, of two kinds of forgiveness. One is general and involves forgiving people because they ask us to. Perhaps this is compatible with Aristotle’s notion of forgiveness although the fact that someone asks the high-minded person to be forgiven would seem to make little difference in his or her decision to pardon. Part of the nobility of such a person is that he or she puts aside the matter, refusing to grow angry or show vindictiveness.

However this may be, the second kind of forgiveness goes way beyond anything suggested by Aristotle. Here the focus of the forgiveness is clearly for the good of the offender. “There is the forgiveness of those who are perfect: when he that is offended seeks out the offender.”³⁸ Such forgiveness is not merely a matter of forgetting (even deliberately) a wrongdoing, but of actively seeking out the enemy for his good. Such selfless reconciliation is clearly related to the Christian view of God and God’s relation to us. Since we have been forgiven (shown love), we forgive (show love). “That charity is more perfect through which one is moved, both in loving and in doing good, toward not only neighbors but also foreigners, and beyond this even to enemies, not only in general but in particular.”³⁹

In conclusion, there is a way in which the human and the divine, in both Greek pagan thought and Christian thought, image one another. A fundamental indifference to us is part of the Greek notion of the divine, and so their notion of human forgiveness is also largely one of indifference. It is putting aside the offense of the offender because it is beneath one to be concerned with petty or evil things. On the other hand, there is an active seeking out of us by the Christian God, even after we have chosen evil and offended Him; hence, the virtue of Christian forgiveness is one of active reconciliation. It is not just the nobility of controlling one’s anger and not taking vengeance, or even of patiently waiting until the offender might come asking for forgiveness. Rather it is pro-active, seeking out the offender who is one’s enemy as God seeks us out, even as we are his enemies through sin, even as we are set on rejecting him.⁴⁰ We must do the same. Real forgiveness requires it, and our God requires of us real forgiveness. St. Thomas ends his *Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer* with a reference to mercy, God’s mercy guiding our mercy, as His forgiveness guides to our forgiveness. “This leads us to another beatitude: *Blessed are the merciful*; since mercifulness makes us show mercy to our neighbor.”⁴¹

³⁷ Ibid, p. 23; Dicendum, quod non mentitur, quia non orat in persona sua, sed Ecclesiae, quae non decipitur: et ideo ponitur ipsa petitio in plurali.

³⁸ Ibid; Unus est perfectorum, ut scilicet offensus requirat offendentem.

³⁹ Saint Thomas Aquinas, *On Charity*, 8, tr. Lottie H. Kendzierski (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1960), pp. 70–71; Ita et perfectior est caritas, per quam non solum ad propinquos, sed etiam ad extraneos, et ulterius ad inimicos, non solum generaliter, sed etiam specialiter, et diligendo et benefaciendo movetur (*De caritate*, in *Questiones Disputatae* (Marietti: Taurini/Romae, 1965)), Vol. II, p. 774.

⁴⁰ “God proves his love for us in that while we still were sinners Christ died for us” (Romans 5:8). “God, who is rich in mercy, out of the great love with which he loved us, even when we were dead through our trespasses, made us live together with Christ” (Ephesians 2:4–5).

⁴¹ *Commentary on The Lord’s Prayer*, Fifth Petition, p. 23; Ex hoc sequitur alia beatitudo: *beati misericordes*: misericordia enim facit nos misereri proximo nostro.